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ABSTRACT: In this paper I focus on the emergence of the concept of the “historical a priori” 
at the origin of Foucault’s archeology.  I emphasize the methodological function of this con-
cept within Foucault’s archaeology, and I maintain that despite the different thesis it entails as 
compared to its philosophical sources, it pertains to one of the main issues of phenomenology, 
that is, the problematization of the relation between reality as it appears in its historicity, and 
transcendentality.  I start from the interest of the young Foucault in existential psychiatry, and 
I focus on the French philosophical context in which Foucault’s Introduction to Ludwig 
Binswanger’s “Dream and Existence” (1954) was conceived.  My aim is to show that the first 
“phenomenological” phase of Foucault’s work is coherent, from a methodological point of 
view, with the development of archaeology intended as “historical epistemology.”  I conclude 
by arguing that Foucault’s archaeology is methodologically linked to Canguilhem’s episte-
mology, in that the latter presents itself as an important attempt at linking together historicity 
and transcendentality. 
 
Keywords: Michel Foucault, phenomenology, historical a priori, Ludwig Binswanger, exis-
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Critical and Pseudo-Critical Appropriations 
At present, we are witnessing a growing interest in the question of Foucault’s involvement 
with phenomenology.  It is an interpretative and philosophical debate in which one can dis-
tinguish three different positions.  While some scholars seek to interpret or evaluate Foucault’s 
work in light of the conceptual and historiographical categories of the philosophical tra-
dition—gnoseology and ontology1—others make a case for simply “taking up Foucault in light 
of Foucault.”  Yet, even some of these authors ultimately identify philosophical influences for 
                                                 
1 I consider the works of respectively Hubert Dreyfus, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982, 1983), and Béatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between 
the Transcendental and the Historical, translated by Edward Pile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) as 
the most representative of this line of interpretation.  More recently, Paule Veyne has tried to deduce from 
Foucault’s work the principles of an empiricist theory of knowledge: Foucault: His Thought, His Character, 
translated by Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). 
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this Foucault; to give a recent example, the Kantian one.2  Thus, these two positions only 
appear to be different, since they share not only the same interpretative point of view, but also 
the idea that philosophy is always trying to answer the same questions (e.g. how do we 
know?) using the same theoretical alternatives (e.g.  empiricism, idealism, criticism etc.). 
By contrast, other scholars have recently tried to emphasize the methodological role that 
categories of the philosophical tradition play within Foucault’s work.  Regarding pheno-
menology, for instance, these scholars seek to examine the use that Foucault makes of some of 
the concepts and the problems outlined by what one can provisionally call the “phenomeno-
logical tradition.”  In particular, I refer here to some works that I consider among the most 
meaningful and fruitful of the most recent Foucault studies: Kevin Thompson’S “Historicity 
and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and the Phenomenology of the Concept,” (2008)3 
and the collected papers in French edited by Pierre Cassou-Noguès and Pascale Gillot: Le con-
cept, le sujet et la science. Cavaillès, Canguilhem, Foucault (2009).4  Also, Johanna Oksala’s Foucault 
on Freedom (2005)5 corresponds in part to such a methodological perspective, insofar as it in-
vestigates Foucault’s relation to phenomenology without looking for a philosophical ground, 
but instead analyzing it in terms of “critical appropriation,” even though this inquiry is 
confined mainly to Foucault’s reading of Husserl. 
This methodological approach goes hand in hand with the need to reassess and specify 
the different meanings, resources and aims that have belonged to phenomenology throughout 
the course of its various readings.6  Most importantly, the strength of such an approach lies in 
that it neither takes Foucault’s claims textually, nor confines itself to a scholastic pursuit of 
influences and lineages, but is rather able to look beyond them, in order to account for Fou-
cault’s “immanent critical appropriation”7 of some of the concepts belonging to the philoso-
phical tradition.  In this way, such a perspective does not insist on criticizing Foucault’s lack of 
philosophical accuracy, and does not judge him in terms of his success or failure in building a 
coherent and viable philosophical project, according to the traditional philosophical catego-
ries.  Rather, it problematizes Foucault’s work from within, by questioning its own reasons 
and aims.  Furthermore, it is an approach that considers philosophical thought as inseparable 
from the context of its different readings and developments, and shows that such readings—
                                                 
2 Colin Koopman, “Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages,” 
Foucault Studies, no. 8 (February 2010), 100-121. 
3 History and Theory, vol. 47, no. 1 (February 2008), 1-18. 
4 Le concept, le sujet et la science. Cavaillès, Canguilhem, Foucault (Vrin: Paris, 2009). 
5 Foucault on Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
6 In his response to Koopman, Kevin Thompson rightly points out that in Foucault’s work, one should dis-
tinguish between almost two different ways of accounting for phenomenology: on the one hand, Foucault 
refers to constitutive phenomenology, and on the other one, he refers to what Thompson calls a “pheno-
menology of the concept” (“Response to Colin Koopman’s ‘Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in 
Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages’,” Foucault Studies, no. 8 (February 2010), 122-128). Similarly, Colin McQuil-
lan claims a greater precision in accounting for the terms “critique” and “transcendentality” respectively in 
Kant and Foucault (“Transcendental Philosophy and Critical Philosophy in Kant and Foucault: Response to 
Colin Koopman”, Foucault Studies, no. 9 (September 2010), 145-155). 
7 Thompson, “Historicity and Transcendentality,” 11. 
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rather than preserving or betraying the purity of their sources—reflect nothing but the rich-
ness of these sources themselves. 
Besides, it is Foucault himself that seems to suggest that we take up this metho-
dological direction, insofar as he presents German phenomenology as the object of different 
readings in France from the end of the 1920s.8  In this way, he not only contextualizes pheno-
menology—thereby differentiating the French reception from its Husserlian source—but he 
also situates his own work within one of the possible appropriations of this source.  It is this 
that allows us to speculate on Foucault’s relation to something like the “phenomenological 
tradition,” and to analyze it in terms of an immanent critical appropriation.  All this, however, 
on the condition that we do not insist that if Foucault aligns himself with one of the two 
lineages he identifies in French phenomenology—the “philosophy of knowledge, of rationa-
lity, and of the concept” led by Cavaillès, Bachelard, Koyré, and Canguilhem—he therefore 
has absolutely nothing to do with the other one, the “philosophy of experience, of meaning, 
and of the subject”9 led by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.  In proposing this, I agree entirely with 
Jean-Michel Salanskis, whose recent paper “Les deux triades de Canguilhem-Foucault”10 exa-
mines critically the viability of the separation outlined by Foucault between a “philosophy of 
knowledge” and a “philosophy of experience,” and—instead of establishing or strengthening 
any divisions and lineages—considers what is at stake for the two sides, as well as their actual 
and possible mutual relations.  I think this is the most appropriate way to deal with the ambi-
valences and outward inconsistencies of the thought of Foucault, a philosopher who claimed 
to have “learned more from Cuvier, Bopp, and Ricardo than from Kant or Hegel.”11  Further-
more, it is also the best way to contribute fruitfully to the thorny debate about Foucault’s rela-
tion to phenomenology. 
For this reason, in what follows I suggest approaching this debate by considering the 
phenomenological research beyond the more or less orthodox adherence to a singular philoso-
phical program.  In particular, I suggest considering two general methodological principles of 
phenomenology which are common to its various lineages: the complementary “principles of 
experience”12 and of “immanence.”13  The first emphasizes the priority of the phenomena and 
entails the conviction that philosophical research should take root in experience in the way in 
which it appears, beginning by describing it.  It is a position that refuses the idea that the rea-
son or the “essence” of phenomena lies externally to them, for example, in what founds, deter-
                                                 
8 Michel Foucault, “Introduction by Michel Foucault,” (1978) in Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the 
Pathological, translated by Caroline R. Fawcett and Robert S. Cohen (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 7-24.  This 
text was revised by Foucault in 1984 and published as “Life: Experience and Science,” translated by Robert 
Hurley, in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, vol. 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, edited by James 
D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1998), 465-478. 
9 Foucault, “Introduction by Michel Foucault,” (1978), 7-8. 
10 Jean-Michel Salanskis, “Les deux triades de Canguilhem-Foucault,” in Pierre Cassou-Noguès and Pascale 
Gillot (eds.), Le concept, le sujet, la science, 237-270. 
11 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), 155.  All further references to 
this work are designated in the text as “MC” followed by the page references to the French edition and then 
to the English translation. 
12 Salanskis, “Les deux triades,” 247. 
13 Jocelyn Benoist, L’idée de phénoménologie (Paris: Beauchesne, 2001). 
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mines, or causes them.  This means—and this is the second principle—that the essence or “a 
priori” of experience is immanent to the experience itself.  That is to say, that the conditions of 
possibility of the phenomena should be found in the phenomena themselves, in the way they 
give themselves. 
From this methodological point of view, Foucault’s archaeology, in that it probes the 
phenomena (the forms of knowledge as well as the forms of experience) by focusing on “the 
specific form of their mode of being,”14 seems to correspond to such a phenomenological 
attitude.  It is probably no accident that Foucault still conserves the term “a priori” for naming 
such a “form,” that is the internal explanatory principle of the phenomena.  Now, phenomena 
change historically and Foucault’s archaeology is concerned with how to account philoso-
phically for the historicity of experience in a way that should keep to the givenness of expe-
rience itself.  Foucault emphasizes this position often throughout his archeological works, as 
we can see already in the programmatic manifesto of archaeology, the Preface to The Birth of 
the Clinic, where he presents the archaeological inquiry as a “study that sets out to disentangle 
the conditions of history” not from some material causes, nor from a purely-transcendental 
point of view, but “from the density of discourse.”15  Or in The Order of Things, where he claims 
that “the history of knowledge can be written only on the basis of what was contemporaneous 
with it […] in terms of conditions and a prioris established in time.”16  But one could mention 
also the Archaeology of Knowledge, where Foucault states that the “specific history” of the 
phenomena for which he aims to account for “does not refer [them] back to the laws of an 
alien development.”17  That is to say, that the laws that govern the forms of experience’s phe-
nomena are immanent to the phenomena, and they can be grasped only by describing these 
forms themselves.  This is why Foucault calls “historical” the a priori in which he recognizes 
the internal reason or condition of possibility of the phenomena, and he makes it the pivot of 
his historical-epistemological research. 
In this way, Foucault’s archaeology pertains to one of the main issues of phenomeno-
logy, that is, the problematization of the relation between reality as it appears in its historicity, 
and transcendentality.  Nonetheless, it is exactly on this point that one should recognize the 
main distance between the Foucaldian archaeological project and Husserl’s phenomenological 
research.  I refer to Husserl here, since, although Husserl is not mentioned by name in Fou-
cault’s Archaeology, the term “historical a priori” reminds us immediately the Crisis of European 
Sciences, whose aim was precisely to determine the “concrete, historical a priori which encom-
passes everything that exists as historical becoming.”18  Despite the source of the expression, it 
                                                 
14 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002), 143.  All further references to this 
work are designated in the text as “AS” followed by the page reference to the French edition and then to the 
English translation. 
15 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic. An Archaeology of Medical Perception (London: Tavistock Publica-
tions, 1973), XIX. All further references to this work are designated in the text as “NC” followed by the 
appropriate page reference to the French edition and then to the English translation. 
16 Foucault, MC, 221/207. 
17 Foucault, AS, 167/143. 
18 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology; An Introduction to Pheno-
menological Philosophy, translated by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 372. 
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would be wrong to recognize a direct Husserlian lineage in Foucault’s “historical a priori.”  It 
is perhaps no accident that Foucault, by the deep irony that often characterizes his style, 
adopts Husserl’s expression precisely in order to emphasize the distance between his own 
archaeology and Husserl’s philosophical historiography.  Indeed, the “historical a priori” in 
Foucault does not aim, like Husserl, at making explicit the “a priori structure contained in 
historicity”19 in order to trace a “universal teleology of reason.”20  According to Foucault, the 
historical a priori is not the a priori of history, but just a methodological tool whose historicity 
consists in its concurrence with the form of the phenomena that it aims at explaining, while 
simultaneously describing them.  That is why Foucault, in his archaeological works, does not 
look for the gnoseological foundation and the scientificity of knowledge,21 since nothing before 
the historical actuality of knowledge itself can lead to its formation and assess its value.  Ac-
cording to this view, the “a priori of the historical knowledge” (savoir) and the “a priori know-
ledge” (connaissance) sought by Husserl’s phenomenology are both subordinated to the frame 
of a “concrete a priori”22 that is simply the “configuration” that sets out and justifies their 
historical possibility.  That is to say, in Foucault’s words, that archaeology is not concerned 
with the “condition of validity” of knowledge, but rather its “condition of reality.”23 
In what follows I inquire into the historicity of such a concept of “a priori” from a pure-
ly methodological perspective.  By emphasizing its function within Foucault’s archaeology, I 
maintain that—despite the different thesis that it entails as compared to its philosophical 
sources—the “historical a priori” satisfies the need of immanence that characterizes phenome-
nological research, and finally, I consider it as the connection between the phenomenological 
attitude and Foucault’s “historical epistemology.”  My argument consists of demonstrating 
that the emphasis on the methodological principles of experience and immanence of pheno-
menology was characteristic of a certain way in which German phenomenology was received 
in France during the first half of the 20th century, in particular at the time when Foucault began 
to conceive his first works in the early 1950s.  I will focus particularly on the role that dis-
ciplines other than pure philosophy—such as psychiatry and biology—played in the way in 
which Husserl, together with Heidegger’s phenomenological insights, was received and 
reworked in France at that time.  I believe indeed that the way in which not only philosophers, 
but also psychiatrists and biologists, proclaimed their closeness to the “phenomenological atti-
tude”24 towards experience could lead us to bring to light the methodological core of pheno-
                                                 
19 Ibid., 369. 
20 Ibid.; On Foucault’s opposition to Husserl’s philosophy of history, see Bernard Charles Flynn, “Michel 
Foucault and the Husserlian Problematic of a Transcendental Philosophy of History,” Philosophy Today, no. 
22 (Fall 1978), 224-238. 
21 Husserl, 373: “The very problem here can be made understandable only through recourse to the historical 
a priori as the universal source of all conceivable problems of understanding.  The problem of genuine histo-
rical explanation comes together, in the case of the sciences, with ‘epistemological’ grounding or clarifi-
cation.” 
22 Foucault, NC 11/XVII; 196/238. Also Husserl characterizes his historical a priori as “concrete”: cf. The Crisis 
of European Sciences, 372. 
23 Foucault, AS, 167/143. 
24 Georges Lanteri-Laura, La psychiatrie phénoménologique. Fondements philosophiques (Paris: PUF), 1963. 
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menology—and not just the doctrinal one—as it was received by the young Foucault.  This 
will lead us not only to understand the sense of Foucault’s own early agreement to phenome-
nology—as it appears in particular in his “Introduction” to Ludwig Binswanger’s “Dream and 
Existence” (1954)25—but also to show the methodological coherence between this first phe-
nomenological phase of his work and the later development of archaeology.  Thus, rather than 
accept or reject outright the thesis of Foucault’s agreement with phenomenology tout court, in 
this paper I seek to identify a certain Foucauldian “attitude” or “style” of phenomenological 
research.  By means of the concept of “historical a priori,” I try to show that this methodolo-
gical attitude shapes Foucault’s archaeological project since the 1950s, at which time Foucault 
firmly believed—as did Ludwig Binswanger—that “man, in his forms of existence, is the only 
means of getting to man.”26 
With this goal in mind, I will first focus on the context of the interest of the young 
Foucault in existential psychiatry and especially in the work of the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig 
Binswanger, which Foucault introduced to France by means his “Introduction” of 1954.   
 
The Phenomenological “Attitude” 
Recent commentators focusing on Foucault’s early works concur in recognizing the phenome-
nological horizon within which they were conceived.27  Hence, the Introduction to “Dream 
and Existence” would be phenomenological for at least two reasons: first, to the extent that it 
dwells on and develops—through Binswanger—Husserl’s problematization of meaning; and 
second, because it embraces the cause of the “existential analysis” (Daseinsanalyse), an anthro-
pological project whose founding guidelines Binswanger recognized in Heidegger’s philoso-
phical program.28  Actually, one should rather note that Foucault’s agreement to Binswanger’s 
                                                 
25 Michel Foucault, “Dream, Imagination and Existence,” Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry, vol. 
XIX, no. 1 (1985), 29-78.  All further references to this work are designated in the text as “DIE” followed by 
the page reference to the French edition and then to the English translation. 
26 Foucault, DIE, 67/32. 
27 Judith Revel, Michel Foucault: expériences de la pensée (Paris: Bordas, 2005). José Luis Moreno Pestaña, En 
devenant Foucault: sociogenèse d’un grand philosophe (Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant, 2006).  
Todd May, “Foucault’s Relation to Phenomenology,” in Gary Gutting (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Foucault, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 284-311.  For a wider bibliographical ac-
count, I permit myself to refer to my monograph: Foucault e la “Daseinsanalyse”: un’indagine metodologica 
(Milano: Mimesis, 2007), 124. 
28 “Traum und Existenz,” Neue Schweizer Rundschau, vol. XXIII (1930), 673-685; 766-779; now in his 
Ausgewählte Werke: in vier Bänden, vol. 3, edited by Hans-Jürg Barun (Heidelberg: Asanger 1992-94), 95-119; 
translated by Jacob Needleman, “Dream and Existence,” in Being-in-the-World. Selected Papers of Ludwig Bin-
swanger (New York: Harper & Row, 1963, 1975), 222-248; this translation was revised by Keith Hoeller in 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, vol. XIX, no. 1 (1984-85), special issue on “Dream and Exis-
tence”. “Dream and Existence “has a crucial role within Binswanger’s corpus, since the Swiss psychiatrist 
expresses there, for the first time, his philosophical ambition of combining Heidegger’s “analytic of Dasein” 
with psychopathology, under the form of an “existential analysis” (Daseinsanalyse).  In this paper, I use in-
differently the expressions “existential psychiatry” and “phenomenological psychiatry.”  Actually, the latter 
expression is more general and includes some forms that differ from each other.  “Existential” psychiatry is 
one of these forms, which comes precisely from Binswanger’s involvement with Heidegger’s analytic. Al-
ready at the time of Binswanger, one has to distinguish, for instance, between Binswanger’s Daseinsanalysis, 
Foucault Studies, No. 14, pp. 154-178. 
 
160 
 
“existential analysis” presents itself already as a criticism towards, at once both Husserl and 
Heidegger’s positions.  If Foucault praises Binswanger’s approach to phenomenology, it is to 
the extent that this approach was able to deal with the problem of experience without re-
ferring—as the pure philosophical phenomenology did—to either the transcendental struc-
tures of knowledge (Husserl’s eidetic of pure consciousness) nor the purely ontological struc-
tures of existence (Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein).  According to Foucault, instead of presen-
ting itself as “some a priori form of philosophical speculation,”29 the existential analysis indeed 
allows the philosopher to “outflank the problem of ontology and anthropology by going 
straight to concrete existence, to its development and its historical content.”30  By applying the 
philosophical phenomenology to the concrete, historical individual experience (Lebens-
geschichte), Binswanger’s agreement to phenomenology not only exceeded the boundaries of 
Husserl’s gnoseology, but also braved the ban that Heidegger had imposed on phenomeno-
logy regarding its temptation of crossing the limit that separated it from some positive 
sciences like psychology, biology, and anthropology.  In Foucault’s own words, “the existen-
tial analysis of Binswanger avoid[ed] any a priori distinction between ontology and anthro-
pology,” and relocated such a distinction “at the terminus of an inquiry whose point of 
departure is characterized not by a line of division, but by an encounter with concrete 
existence.”31 Thus, Foucault’s agreement with Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse should be under-
stood as an important indicator of a non-doctrinal commitment to phenomenology, as he 
states quite ironically in his Introduction: “we are fallible enough to believe in history even 
when it is a question of Existenz.”32 
Nonethless, to most Foucault scholars the Introduction to “Dream and Existence,” as 
well as the encounter between Foucault and Binswanger,33 appears to conflict with the anti-
                                                                                                                                                                  
and phenomenology as it was understood by other psychiatrists such as Karl Jaspers and Eugène Min-
kowski.  To be precise, already within Binswanger’s work one could distinguish more “phases,” throughout 
which the keystone moves initially from Husserl to Heidegger (from “Dream and Existence” until Bin-
swanger’s works of the 1950s on schizophrenia), and then toward Husserl again (when Binswanger comes 
back, in the 1960s, toward a more gnoseological approach grounded in Husserl’s late genetic phenomeno-
logy). It is a matter of important and necessary differentiation. Nonetheless, I wonder if it is not equally 
plausible to take into account the common use of the expression “phenomenological psychiatry,” one that 
somehow implicitly accounts for the fact that it is not an ultimate and definitive philosophical program that 
psychiatrists referring to phenomenology look for, but rather an “attitude,” namely, a more general metho-
dological inspiration. 
29 Foucault, DIE 66/32. 
30 Ibid., 67/32. 
31 Ibid., 67/32-33. 
32 Ibid., 80/43. 
33 Foucault visited Binswanger’s psychiatric clinic in Kreuzlingen (Switzerland) at the beginning of the 1950s, 
in order to submit to Binswanger the French translation of “Dream and Existence.”  See Didier Eribon, Michel 
Foucault, translated by Betsy Wing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).  See also Roland Kuhn, 
“L’essai de Ludwig Binswanger ‘Le rêve et l’existence’ et sa signification pour la psychothérapie,” in Hervé 
Mésot (ed.), Des interprétations du rêve. Psychanalyse, herméneutique, Daseinsanalyse (Paris: PUF, 2001), 153-164. 
The correspondence between Foucault and Binswanger is now kept in the Binswanger Archive of the 
University of Tübingen (Germany).  Some letters—translated into Italian by Chantal Marazia—have been 
published in the on-line journal: Pol.it. The Italian on Line Psychiatric Magazine 
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anthropological and anti-phenomenological struggle that characterizes Foucault’s thought 
since the 1960s.  Thus, commentators usually consider Foucault’s writing on Binswanger as 
merely the result of a kind of youthful fascination for an anthropological psychiatry aiming to 
reach something like the verities of the human being.  This is the reason why any attempt at 
bringing closer archaeology and Daseinsanalyse seems to be destined to fail.  Besides, this is a 
position that is supported by Foucault’s own later criticisms against the existential approach in 
psychopathology, at the time of the publication of History of Madness (1961).  At the beginning 
of the 1960s, on the one hand, Foucault can no longer be satisfied with the historical un-
criticalness of Binswanger’s anthropological commitment, one which was limited to the 
individual history and therefore had an “ambiguous link with a psychiatric practice, which it 
simultaneously ignored and took for granted.”34  Faced with concrete historical psychiatric 
practices, existential anthropology now appears to Foucault to be something like a “mythical 
explanation.”35  This is the reason why in the second edition of Mental Illness and Personality 
(1954)—published in 1962 with the new title of Mental Illness and Psychology—the final chapters 
are no longer concerned with the “existential forms of illness,” but with their “historical 
conditions,” and Foucault goes so far as to conclude that “it is only in history that one can 
discover the sole concrete a priori from which mental illness draws, with the empty opening 
up of its possibility, its necessary figures.”36  On the other hand, Foucault can no longer accept 
the project of building an anthropology, a project that he had strongly opposed in his com-
plementary dissertation of 1960 on Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,37 and 
which will later be the main polemic target of The Order of Things.38 
Still, I think it is worth coming back to Foucault’s interest in Binswanger’s phenomeno-
logical approach and considering if it is possible to recognize in some points a coherence or 
continuity between it and the archaeological project.  One should consider first that phenome-
nological psychopathology had a strategic philosophical importance in France since the 1920s 
for many of the most meaningful figures of Foucault’s philosophical education.  For instance, 
consider the role Georges Canguilhem acknowledges to the phenomenological approach of 
psychiatrists like Daniel Lagache, Eugène Minkowski, and Henry Ey in order to account for 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(http://www.psychiatryonline.it/ital/chantal2004.htm), section “Epistemology and History,” directed by Ma-
rio Galzigna. 
34 Michel Foucault, “Preface to The History of Sexuality Volume II,” in Paul Rabinow (eds.), The Foucault Reader, 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 333-339, 334. 
35 Michel Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology (Berkley etc.: University of California Press, 1987), 85. 
36 Ibid. Foucault concludes the first part of Mental Illness and Psychology by arguing that “if this subjectivity of 
the insane is both a call to and an abandonment of the world, is it not of the world itself that we should ask 
the secret of its enigmatic status?” (56)  The reference to the concept of “world” is quite ironic here, since this 
concept—as I will show later—is central in Binswanger’s existential psychiatry, whose aim was exactly to in-
quiry into the patients’ “world project,” a concept taken by Binswanger from Heidegger’s Dasein or “being-
in-the-world.” 
37 Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant's Anthropology, (1961) translated and edited by Roberto Nigro and 
Kate Briggs (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008). 
38 On this point, see in particular Béatrice Han’s Foucault’s Critical Project, and “Foucault and Heidegger on 
Kant and Finitude,” in Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg (eds.), Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters 
(Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 127-162. 
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the normative conception of the pathological as it is outlined in his thesis of 1943 On the Nor-
mal and the Pathological.39  But one should also consider the importance that psychopathological 
research has for the École normale’s philosophers in the second half of the 1940s, at the time 
when Foucault is a student, Georges Gusdorf and Louis Althusser are philosophy lecturers 
who organize conferences and encounters with some of the most meaningful psychiatrists of 
the time, including Georges Daumézon, Julian de Ajuriaguerra, Henry Ey or Jacques Lacan.40 
Jean Hyppolite, when he becomes the director of the École normale in 1954, is also strongly 
convinced of the philosophical role that research in psychopathology could play for philo-
sophy, and he frequently discusses with Foucault the essays that the latter publishes in the 
same year: Mental Illness and Personality, and the Introduction to Binswanger.  Furthermore, at 
this time Foucault reads Lacan’s writings, and it seems that he also attends some of his lec-
tures at Sainte-Anne hospital.41  Now, it is worth emphasizing that Lacan was among one of 
the first psychiatrists in France—from the beginning of the 1930s until at least the first half of 
the 1940s—to adopt in psychopathology the phenomenological approach of Binswanger and 
Karl Jaspers.42 
It is exactly within this context that Foucault reflects upon the problem of madness 
throughout the 1950s.  In fact, despite his objections he ends up addressing the phenomeno-
logical psychopathology in 1961, his History of Madness still owes a lot to the phenomeno-
logical perspective.  First, one should compare Foucault’s intention of writing the history of 
“madness” before any psychopathological conceptualization, to the psychiatric-phenomeno-
logical project of approaching the mental disease by considering it as non-scientific phenome-
non, independently from any clinical classification and before any medical appropriation, as a 
“vital and human truth.”  A truth—according to Minkowski’s words—“of which history could 
grasp only what it can understand ‘historically,’ and that it is far from being the whole.”43 
Similarly, Foucault aims to trace the “degree zero of the history” where madness “was un-
differentiated experience”44 and “still remains for us the mode of access to the natural truth of 
man.”45  But, while Minkowski, faced with this “essentially human madness” that “affects the 
                                                 
39 Georges Canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, translated by Carolyn R. Fawcett (Dordrecht, Bos-
ton: Reidel, 1978), Part II, chap. 1. 
40 For all these biographical accounts, see Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault. 
41 According to Maurice Pinguet, Foucault attended Lacan’s seminar at Sainte-Anne hospital in 1953: see 
“Les années d’apprentissage,” Le Débat, no. 41 (1986), 122-131, 125.  David Macey, in his biography of Fou-
cault, mentions the French psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu, who stated that himself attended Lacan’s lecture 
together with Foucault, although unfortunately he does not specify which one: see The Lives of Michel Fou-
cault: A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993). 
42 On this point, see Henning Schmidgen, “Fortunes diverses. L’œuvre de jeunesse de Jacques Lacan et la 
phénoménologie,” Psychanalyse à l’université, vol. XIX, no. 76 (1994), 111-134. 
43 Eugène Minkowski, “Psychiatrie et métaphysique. A la recherche de l’humain et du vécu,” Revue de Méta-
physique et de Morale, no. 52 (1947), 333-358, 339. 
44 Michel Foucault, “Preface to the 1961 edition,” in his History of Madness, translated by Jonathan Murphy 
and Jean Khalfa (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), XXVII. 
45 Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, 74. 
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human being’s destiny by excluding him from the living beings’ community,”46 opted for 
reforming psychiatry by giving it an anthropological turn,47 Foucault prefers to investigate the 
phenomenon of the exclusion, that is “that other trick through which men, the gesture of 
sovereign reason that locks up their neighbour, communicate and recognize each other in the 
merciless language of non-madness.”48  Thus, Foucault ends up denouncing any kind of psy-
chiatry, since “if carried back to its roots, the psychology of madness would appear to be not 
the mastery of mental illness and hence the possibility of its disappearance, but the destruction 
of psychology itself and the discovery of that essential, non-psychological because non-
moralizable relation that is the relation between Reason and Unreason.”49 
It is a position that, at the time of publication of History and Madness, roused the reac-
tion of the group of psychiatrists of L’Évolution Psychiatrique, a journal that—since its founda-
tion in 1925—had a fundamental role in supporting the existential stream of psychiatry in 
France,50 thereby becoming the election platform for all French psychiatrists who aimed to 
develop the phenomenological approach to psychopathology.  The leading figure of the 
group, Henri Ey, accused Foucault’s intellectual position of being “ideological,” and he con-
sidered such an “archeological” way of “killing psychiatry” to be inconsistent with Foucault’s 
early interest in “the fundamental problems of psychopathology.”51  Yet, on this same occa-
sion, Eugène Minkowski recalled Foucault’s Introduction to “Dream and Existence” and he 
maintained that one should consider it as fundamental “in order to situate Foucault’s 
thought.”52  I think this call to situate or contextualize Foucault’s work is valuable if we want 
to understand the sense of Foucault’s reading of phenomenological psychiatry and, conse-
quently, the meaning this kind of call to phenomenology has at the origin of Foucault’s ar-
chaeological research. 
The compatibility between the existential approach in psychiatry and Foucault’s archa-
eology has also been indirectly argued by another French psychiatrist, who had a great role in 
                                                 
46 Minkowski, “Psychiatrie et métaphysique,” 339-340: “Elle [la folie] se traduit par une brèche, profonde et 
irréparable à première vue.  Mais placé en face de l’un de nos semblables, quel qu’il soit, nous ne saurions 
nous contenter de l’idée d’une brèche comme telle, ni renoncer à voir en lui un “semblable”. […] Et c’est 
ainsi que naît le désir de réduire la brèche au strict minimum […].  Et là prend naissance le courant, non pas 
philanthropique, mais anthropologique de la psychiatrie.” 
47 On this point, see also Henri Ey, “La ‘folie’ et les valeurs humaines,” (1945) in his Études psychiatriques, vol. 
I (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer & Cie, 1948, 2nd ed. in 1952), 15-21; and “Anthropologie du malade mental,” 
Esprit, vol. XX, no. 197 (1952), 891-896. 
48 Foucault, “Preface to the 1961 edition,” XXVII. 
49 Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, 74. 
50 See the “Avant propos” of the first issue of the journal, by Angelo Hesnard and René Laforgue: L’Évolution 
Psychiatrique, vol. I, no. 1 (1925), 7.  It is precisely L’Évolution psychiatrique that published in 1938 (vol. X, no. 
1, 3-34) the first article by Binswanger in French: “La conception de l’homme, chez Freud, à la lumière de 
l’anthropologie philosophique,” translated by Hans Pollnow. 
51 See Henry Ey’s opening speech to the “Journées annuelles de l’Évolution psychiatrique,” 6-7 décembre 1969: 
“La conception idéologique de l’Histoire de la folie de Michel Foucault,” L’Évolution Psychiatrique, vol. XXXVI, 
no. 2 (1971), 225.  Henry Ey had written a review of the French translation of Binswanger’s “Dream and 
Existence” in 1956, and he had described Foucault’s Introduction as “great and substantial” (“Rêve et 
existence,” L’Évolution Psychiatrique, vol. XXI (1956), 109-118). 
52 Ey, “La conception idéologique de l’Histoire de la folie,” 288. 
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developing the phenomenological approach in France: Georges Lanteri-Laura.  Lanteri-Laura 
starts by wondering about the issues of the stream of “anti-psychiatry,” a movement that, 
since its origins in the 1960s, has linked together the existential tradition of psychiatry and 
Foucault’s archaeological analysis.53  He maintains that phenomenology lent to anti-psychiatry 
its skills and issues, insofar as it did not present itself as a doctrine, but rather as an “attitude” 
able to “put in parentheses any preliminary theoretical position” towards any established (re-
ductive) system of knowledge.54  Hence, phenomenology would formulate the need to doubt 
the validity of any interpretation intended as the “reductive choice” performed on a subject, 
which should be considered instead from an historical perspective.  From this point of view, 
Foucault’s essay of 1954 on Binswanger shares with The History of Madness such a phenomeno-
logical need, to the extent that it refuses to conceive the forms of existence and their expres-
sions from the perspective of a science “of the order of positive knowledge.”55  Through 
Binswanger, Foucault clearly expresses the phenomenological project of overcoming at once 
“science” and “speculation,” in order to let the phenomena appear, rather than tracing them 
back to a given order of meanings or categories.  As Foucault himself makes clear in 1980, if 
“reading what has been defined ‘existential analysis’ or ‘phenomenological psychiatry’ cer-
tainly was important for [him] at a period when he was working in psychiatric hospitals,” it is 
because such a current showed him “something different to counterbalance the traditional 
grids of the medical gaze.”56  Thus, this archaeology, that ends up criticizing phenomenologi-
cal psychiatry, locates in its turn the grids that rule the different ways of experiencing reality 
as well as the systems of orientation of the gaze that delimit and classify it. 
                                                 
53 It would probably be an exaggeration to affirm―as the French philosopher Henri Maldiney has 
done―that “if the phenomenological attitude had prevailed in psychiatry, the anti-psychiatry would not be 
born” (“Psychose et presence,” (1976), in his Penser l’homme et la folie. A la lumière de l’analyse existentielle et de 
l’analyse du destin, (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1991, 2nd ed., 1997), 5-82, 9).  Yet, one should admit that existen-
tial psychiatry had an overriding place in the works of such “anti-psychiatrists” as Roland Laing and David 
Cooper, that refer explicitly to the projects of, respectively, Karl Jaspers, Eugène Minkowski, and Ludwig 
Binswanger. Just think, for instance, of Laing’s main work’ subtitle: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness 
(London, Tavistock, 1960), or the title of the collection in which appeared in 1964 Laing and Cooper’s Reason 
and Violence: “Studies in Existential Analysis and Phenomenology.”  One could mention also the Italian psy-
chiatrist Franco Basaglia, who linked together existential psychiatry and Foucault’s work (see his works of 
the period 1953-1968: Scritti, (Torino: Einaudi, 1981-82), edited by Franca Ongaro Basaglia, vol. I: Dalla psi-
chiatria fenomenologica all’esperienza di Gorizia). 
54 Georges Lanteri-Laura, “Le Voyage dans l’anti-psychiatrie anglaise,” L’Évolution psychiatrique, vol. LXI, no. 
3 (1996), 621-633, 623.  A similar remark has been done by Todd May in regard to Foucault’s career itself, in 
order to find a common thread between the early writings on phenomenology and the later political works. 
According to May, what remains continuous throughout Foucault’s career is an underlying non-reductive 
approach to the questions: “What are we? What might we be?” (“Foucault’s Relation to Phenomenology,” 
307-308: “As Foucault’s thought matures, the character of what is ‘heavy and oppressive’ changes.  But what 
is at issue―who we are, who we might be―remains the same. In the end, Foucault leaves phenomenology, 
but the spirit of phenomenology does not leave him.”) 
55  Foucault, DIE, 66/32. 
56 Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx. Conversation with Duccio Trombadori, translated by R. James Goldstein 
and James Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), 72. 
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Furthermore, in another of his last writings—the Preface to the American edition of his 
History of Sexuality—Foucault takes up again his early work on Binswanger and explicitly as-
serts that: 
 
To study forms of experience in this way—in their history—is an idea that originated with 
an earlier project, in which I made use of the methods of existential analysis in the field of 
psychiatry and in the domain of ‘mental illness’.”57 
 
This is obviously not a matter of taking such a statement textually.  Yet, I believe that this way 
of emphasizing the methodological meaning of the phenomenological psychiatry, at the early 
stages of archaeology, could somehow orientate an inquiry into Foucault’s relation to pheno-
menology. 
I now propose to again take up Minkowski’s suggestion about the expediency of situa-
ting Foucault’s archaeology of madness within the theoretical context of the Introduction to 
“Dream and Existence.”  I consider it to be highly relevant that it is Minkowski who makes 
this remark, since Minkowski was one of the first in France to refer explicitly to the work of 
Ludwig Binswanger, since his early writings of the 1920s, with whom he shared the project of 
reforming psychopathology according to the “new orientation” that phenomenology could 
give to it.58  And it is Minkowski again who—in the early 1950s—stressed the expediency of 
translating into French the works of his Swiss colleague in order to thereby introduce the 
“existential analysis” in the context of French psychiatry.59  One should be reminded, in this 
respect, that the Introduction to “Dream and Existence” of 1954 is not an isolated case among 
Foucault’s works, since the philosopher later worked on the French translation of Binswan-
ger’s clinical case of Suzanne Urban in 1957.60  
Actually, with the exception of Minkowski’s references during the 1920s, Binswanger’s 
work in France begins to be known only during the 1940s, and—interestingly—not only 
within the field of the clinical psychopathology, but in the context of a philosophical-
                                                 
57 Foucault, “Preface to the History of Sexuality Volume II” 333-339.  The italic is mine. 
58 Minkowski presented his first phenomenological essay (“Étude psychologique et analyse phénoméno-
logique d’un cas de mélancolie schizophrénique”) in 1922 at the 63rd session of the “Schweizer Verein für 
Psychiatrie” in Zürich, the same occasion in which Binswanger presented his lecture “On Phenomenology” 
(“Über Phänomenologie”).  There are many references to Binswanger throughout the work of Minkowski: cf. 
“La genèse de la notion de schizophrénie et ses caractères essentiels,” L’Évolution Psychiatrique, vol. I, no. 1 
(1925), 193-236; La schizophrénie. Psychopathologie des schizoïdes et des schizophrènes (Paris: Payot 1927; Desclée 
de Brouwer, 1953); Le temps vécu. Études phénoménologiques et psychopathologiques (Paris: d’Artrey 1933), 285; 
“Phénoménologie et analyse existentielle en psychopathologie,” L’Évolution Psychiatrique, no. 1 (1948), 137-
185; “Le contact humain,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. LV, no. 2 (1950), 113-127; “Les notions 
bleulériennes: voie d’accès aux analyses phénoménologiques et existentielles,” Annales Médico-Psychologiques, 
vol. XV, no. 2 (1957), 833-844. 
59 Eugène Minkowski, La Schizophrénie (1953), 237.  See also J.H. van Den Berg, “Bref exposé de la position 
phénoménologique en psychiatrie,” L’Évolution Psychiatrique, no. 2 (1947), 23-41. 
60 Ludwig Binswanger, “Studien zum Schizophrenieproblem: Der Fall Suzanne Urban,” (1952-53) Ausge-
wählte Werke, vol. 4: Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie, edited by Alice Holzhey-Kunz (Heidelberg, Asanger, 1994), 
210-332; French translation by Jacqueline Verdeaux, Roland Kuhn and Michel Foucault, Le cas Suzanne 
Urban. Étude sur la schizophrénie (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957). 
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epistemological problematization of psychology and the various “explanatory idols” by which 
it was attempting to grasp “human reality.”61  I refer here to Jean-Paul Sartre’s criticism of em-
pirical psychology’s postulates as it appears in the “phenomenological ontology” of 1943 
(Being and Nothingness), although the reference to Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse is not explicit in 
his outline of an “existential psychoanalysis,” and despite Sartre’s belief that “this psycho-
analysis has not yet found its Freud.”62  But above all, one should refer to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945).  This work refers in turn to Binswanger’s phenome-
nological approach, and presents it by making use of Sartre’s expression: “existential psycho-
analysis.”63  Yet, differently from Sartre, Merleau-Ponty distances the concept of “existence” 
from any implication with the concept of “consciousness,” and analyzes it within the context 
of a wider problematization of the experience of the “lived body” in the phenomenon of per-
ception.  Now, Merleau-Ponty’s way of employing Binswanger’s methodological approach for 
his own phenomenological purpose appears to me to be very important in order to grasp not 
only Foucault’s own reading of Binswanger, but also the role that this early interest in pheno-
menological psychiatry plays throughout the course of Foucault’s thought. 
Like Binswanger, Merleau-Ponty conceives the notions of “expression” and “meaning” 
as the “direction” or the “embodied sense” according to which existence realizes itself as an ir-
reducible whole of body and world.  He presents this argument by giving an example of a cli-
nical case of Binswanger, that of a young girl who lost the use of speech.  According to Mer-
leau-Ponty, what characterizes the phenomenological-existential approach is its attitude to-
wards the phenomenon, in this case the symptom: instead of looking for the hidden cause 
(internal or external) or meaning of it, the phenomenologist explains it by a “return to exis-
tence” that consists in dwelling upon its “modalities” or “forms.”  Now, according to the 
phenomenologist these forms actually are already the phenomenon’s explication, so the loss of 
the speech is the refuse of co-existence.  In other words, the expression is already what it signi-
fies, the sign “does not convey its significance, it is filled with it.”64  The phenomenological or 
existential analysis thus works within the plane of immanence of the phenomenon, and it is 
exactly this methodological attitude which characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s approach to expe-
rience. 
Now, the concern of liberating expression from the grip of a pure “theory of meaning” 
also characterizes Foucault’s approach to the themes of “meaning” and “expression” as it is 
                                                 
61 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943), translated by Hazel 
E. Barnes (London: Methuen & Co., 1957), Part IV, Chap. 2-II: “Existential Psychoanalysis,” 559. 
62 Ibid., 575. 
63 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (1945), translated by Colin Smith (London, New York: 
Routledge 2002), 161.  Actually Binswanger has never used the expression “existential psychoanalysis” for 
characterizing his psychiatric approach. The Binswanger’s works to which Merleau-Ponty refers are: “Über 
Psychotherapie“ (1935); “Traum und Existenz”, (1930); Über Ideenflucht (1932); “Das Raumprobleme in der 
Psychopathologie” (1933). 
64 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 161.  On this point, see Ludwig Binswanger, Le cas Suzanne Ur-
ban, 67: “Dans la métaphore théâtrale d’Ellen West, nous ne verrons pas seulement une métaphore au sens 
psychologique et poétique, une image évocatrice, mais surtout une expression immédiate verbale du mode 
de son être dans le monde.” 
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outlined in the Introduction to “Dream and Existence.”  Here Foucault in his turn distinguish-
es between “image” and “expression” or poetic imagination, and he maintains that the latter 
does not find its greatest expansion “where it finds the greatest number of substitutes for 
reality, where it invents the most duplications and metaphors, but, on the contrary, where it 
best restores presence to itself—where the proliferation of analogies well up, and where the 
metaphors by neutralizing each other, restore the depth to immediacy.”65  Foucault’s argu-
ment here is very close not only to Merleau-Ponty’s approach, but also to the arguments out-
lined by both Minkowski and Lacan during the 1930s, when they claimed the immediacy of 
the phenomenon or the expression against any hermeneutical approach intended to discover 
in it a hidden meaning.66  So, what draws Foucault’s attention to the existential analysis in the 
middle of the 1950s is not only its “basic opposition to any science of human facts of the order 
of positive knowledge, experimental analysis, and naturalistic reflection”67 but its distance 
from a philosophical approach that needs to go beyond or before the phenomena in order to 
explain them.68 It is exactly this call to immanence that Foucault emphasizes when, in the 
1980s, he recalls the “methods” of phenomenological psychiatry as a way of approaching the 
forms of experience “in their history,” namely, in their concreteness.  By turning to Binswan-
ger, so Foucault suggests, like Merleau-Ponty before him, the opportunity of looking at phe-
nomenology not from a doctrinal perspective, but only as a “philosophy which puts essences 
back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world 
                                                 
65 Foucault, DIE, 115-116/71-72. 
66 See in particular Eugène Minkowski, Vers une cosmologie. Fragments philosophiques (Paris: Montaigne, 1936), 
256: “Quant au concept du symbole, à l’instar de la métaphore, il disjoint trop à notre gré ce qui symbolise et 
ce qui est symbolisé, et fait ainsi violence aux données immédiates que nous avons devant nous.”  As re-
gards Lacan, I refer here to his first writings on paranoia, that analyze the psychopathological expression not 
from a “semantic,” but from a “syntactic” perspective.  See Lacan’s “Le problème du style et la conception 
psychiatrique des formes paranoïaques de l’expérience,” in his De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec 
la personnalité (Paris: Le François, 1932; Seuil, 1975), 387. 
67 Foucault, DIE, 66/32. 
68 The two targets of Foucault’s criticism, in his essay on Binswanger, are Freud’s interpretation of dreams 
and Husserl’s eidetic of consciousness.  At the origin of the defects of Freudian theory Foucault sees “an 
inadequate elaboration of the notion of symbol: Freud takes the symbol as merely the tangential point 
where, for an instant, the limpid meaning joins with the material of the images taken as a transformed and 
transformable residue of perception.  The symbol is that surface of contact, that film, which separates, as it 
joins, an inner world and an external world.” (DIE 72/36)  Thus, psychoanalysis has exhausted image in the 
multiplicity of meanings, but “the imaginary world has its own laws, its specific structures, and image is 
somewhat more than the immediate fulfillment of meaning.” (70/35)  The criticism against Husserl’s 
phenomenology is more moderate.  According to Foucault, while the Freudian analysis sees only an artificial 
connection—the symbol—between meaning and expression, “phenomenology, on the contrary, enables one 
to recapture the meaning in the context of the expressive act which founds it,” (DIE 78/41) thereby “rein-
stat[ing] acts of expression in their fullness.” (DIE 79/42)  Thus, phenomenology would show the possibility 
of developing itself towards a “theory of expression.”  Nevertheless, even though phenomenology is able to 
reinstate the act of meaning in its expressive base, “it cut [it] off from any form of objective indication.  No 
external context can restore it in its truth,” so there is no possibility of a “real encounter” with time, space, 
and others. (ibid)  This is why, Foucault concludes, the expression cannot be understood “along the lines of 
pure phenomenology.” 
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from any starting point other than that of their ‘facticity’.”69  In this sense, the pheno-
menological approach would consist, for the young Foucault, in the “analysis of the immanent 
meaning of any lived experience.”70 
So, what emerges from this analysis, and—more generally—from the interest of these 
French philosophers in phenomenological psychiatry, is a methodological reading of German 
phenomenology that goes beyond the traditional philosophical concerns of gnoseology and 
ontology.  Hence, during the first half of the 20th century in France, phenomenology is not 
intended to be just a philosophical doctrine to be accepted or rejected as a whole, nor does it 
coincide outright with Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, or with Heidegger’s pheno-
menological ontology.  For this same reason, it is also not intended to be a means for doubting 
the plausibility of the empirical sciences from a purely philosophical point of view.  The phe-
nomenological “attitude” is rather employed by these same sciences as a methodological tool 
by which they could define and grasp better, “from inside,” their own objects.   
One should consider, in this respect, that the phenomenological criterion of immanence 
at that time becomes in France the theoretical core not only of a certain part of psychiatry, but 
also as part of a biology whose goal is to approach life not by an extrinsic rationality, but from 
the immanent normativity of life itself.  It is worth remarking, for instance, that in 1946 the 
French psychiatrist Daniel Lagache considered Canguilhem’s thesis on The Normal and the 
Pathological as an “anthropological phenomenology,” and he concluded by urging both psy-
chology and biology to become aware of the potential implications of considering the “posi-
tion of man in the world.”71  Canguilhem himself, indeed, in a paper written in 1947 on “biolo-
gical philosophy,” shows the expediency of conceiving of biology not just as “the universe of 
science, objectivity, and hors de soi” as opposed to the “universe of consciousness, subjectivity, 
value, and meaning,”72 but as research that would be able to grasp all these concepts as emer-
ging as the intrinsic determinations of the organism.  It is exactly the immanence of the philo-
sophical concepts to the living being that Canguilhem claims in his harangue against rationa-
lism, or what he calls “a philosophy of après coup.”73  And this is also the sense of his almost 
Heideggerian argument, according to which man distinguishes himself from plants and ani-
mals to the extent that he “inhabits the world.”74  
Foucault will describe very well the concern of this philosophical biology in 1978, in his 
Introduction to Canguilhem—namely, the text where he outlines the two lineages of the 
                                                 
69 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, VII. 
70 Michel Foucault, “La psychologie de 1850 à 1950”, in Dits et écrits, vol. I, 127. 
71 Daniel Lagache, “Le normal et le pathologique d’après Georges Canguilhem,” Bulletin de la Faculté des 
Lettres de Strasbourg, no. 24 (1946), 117-130, see 129-130. 
72 Georges Canguilhem, “Note sur la situation faite en France à la philosophie biologique,” Revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale, no. 52 (1947), 322-332.  It is worth remarking that this paper preceded a contribu-
tion of Eugène Minkowski on “Psychiatrie et métaphysique. A la recherche de l’humain et du vécu,” 333-
358.  
73 Canguilhem, “Note sur la situation faite en France à la philosophie biologique,” 327. 
74 Canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, 104; “The Living and Its Milieu” (1946-47), in his Knowledge 
of Life, translated by Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), 98-120. 
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French way of receiving phenomenology—where he recognizes the specificity of the biolo-
gist’s knowledge in that it examines “a type of object to which he himself belongs, since he 
lives and since he […] develops this nature of the living in an activity of knowledge.”75  It is 
exactly this concurrence of the philosophical investigation with its “objects” that Merleau-
Ponty emphasizes in 1947, in the same issue of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale where 
Canguilhem publishes his “Note” on philosophical biology.  He writes: “The universality of 
knowledge is no longer guaranteed in each of us by that stronghold of absolute (a priori) 
consciousness,” neither is it guaranteed by “the evidence of the object.”76  “The germ of uni-
versality,” is to be found “in the thing where our perception places us.”77  This means that the 
“universality” for which philosophical research looks is always embodied and situated in a 
historical existence; it is to be found in existence as experiencing, living, being in the world, or, 
to quote Foucault’s essay on Binswanger: ”existence which is living itself and is experiencing 
itself, which recognizes itself or loses itself, in a world that is at once the plenitude of its own 
project and the ‘element’ of its situation.”78  Hence, Merleau-Ponty concludes, the only a priori 
the philosopher can turn to in his analysis of experience is something like an “a priori of the 
species,” an a priori that coincides with the concrete, historical “normative structure” of being 
in the world.  This is an a priori that Merleau-Ponty borrows from the Gestalt theory, and 
 
of which [man] forms no distinct concept but which he puts together as an experienced 
pianist deciphers an unknown piece of music: without himself grasping the motives of each 
gesture or each operation, without being able to bring to the surface of consciousness all the 
sediment of knowledge which he is using at that moment.”79 
 
Here, Merleau-Ponty’s point is that the “facts” of behavior correspond to a structure or norm, 
and that this norm is “inscribed in the facts themselves.”80  That means that this “internal rule” 
which lets these facts appear “is not the external unfolding of a pre-existing reason,” but 
coincides with this same appearance (“it is the very appearance of the world and not the condition of 
its possibility; it is the birth of a norm and is not realized according to a norm.”81)  Now, such a con-
crete a priori, conceived as the norm of the phenomena and targeted to uncover in the expe-
rience itself the principle of its own justification, is the methodological core of Binswanger’s 
phenomenological approach.  As I will show later, Binswanger, like Merleau-Ponty, empha-
sizes the common methodological thread between the phenomenological attitude towards 
phenomena and a biology that inquires into the living being starting from its immanent 
normativity. 
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I believe that this reference to biology is crucial in order to understand the methodolo-
gical meaning the French philosophers give to phenomenology at the moment they receive 
and rework it during the first half of the 20th century.  It is worth remarking, on this point, that 
it is exactly in this scientific and philosophical context that the young Foucault, in 1958, trans-
lates into French the main work of the German physiologist Viktor von Weizsäcker: Der Ge-
staltkreis: Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen (1940),82 a work that, at once, claimed 
its closeness to the phenomenological attitude towards existence and put the idea of the “inner 
normativity” of life at the heart of the study of the living being and the structure of its being in 
the world.  Now, this work, together with Kurt Goldstein’s Der Aufbau des Organismus (1934)83 
had already been the subject of Merleau-Ponty’s research in the 1940s (La structure du com-
portement; Phénoménologie de la perception), and was published in the same collection of 
Binswanger’s French translations (“Dream and Existence” and the clinical case of Suzanne 
Urban).84 
I think this theoretical context is fundamental not only in order to understand Fou-
cault’s own reading of Binswanger’s project during the 1950s, but also in order to find a com-
mon thread between Foucault’s early interest in phenomenological psychiatry and archaeo-
logy.  In what follows I dwell first upon Binswanger’s methodology, and in particular on his 
approach to the phenomenological concept of “a priori.”  I will try then to show that Binswan-
ger’s own approach to this concept, intended as the immanent condition of possibility of 
experience, is compatible, from a methodological point of view, with Foucault’s archaeological 
project of uncovering, in a given system of knowledge, the “conditions which define, together 
with its historical possibility, the domain of its experience and the structure of its rationality.”85 
 
A Paradoxical A Priori 
The main question at stake in Binswanger’s commitment to phenomenology is a methodolo-
gical one.  From the beginning of the 1920s, Binswanger looks indeed for a scientific method 
that would let the psychiatrist link the analysis of the individual, historical existences to the 
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rational “form” that encompasses them and by which they could be explained.  It is a matter of 
both respecting the individuality and concreteness of existence and going beyond its singular 
and contingent expressions in order to look for their conditions of possibility.  According to 
Binswanger, these conditions of possibility of phenomena are the principles or the “norms” 
that governs them.  It is exactly in this sense that Binswanger’s reading of Husserl’s concept of 
“essence” (Wesen) and later Heidegger’s concept of Dasein respectively, should be understood.  
So, Binswanger’s reading of phenomenology consists less in the application of some pheno-
menological concepts to the field of empiric science than in a methodological use of them.  The 
psychiatrist indeed employs these concepts as a kind of “systematic clue” to be used in order 
to understand the different basic forms or styles by which men organize and structure their 
“being-in-the-world” as a “world project.”86  Hence, Dasein, conceived as the “structure” of 
existence, could guide the psychiatrist through the various expressions of mental diseases, fur-
nishing him with the “structural a priori” that let him understand and explain them, but also 
classify them from a scientific point of view. 
This perspective is particularly clear in Binswanger’s 1946 article on the existential 
approach in psychiatry.  Here Binswanger explicitly states that, in the field of psychopatho-
logy, the concept of Dasein—that in Heidegger is an ontological thesis—should be employed 
by a “practical existential analysis” as a methodological tool or “thread” targeted to study the 
forms that structure the patients’ world project.  Hence, Binswanger conceives the Dasein as a 
“structure” functioning “according to a positive norm,” a norm that one should consider on 
the basis of its expression as an action.87  Now, it is worth remarking that at the time of his 
theoretical commitment to Heidegger’s philosophy, Binswanger also emphasizes the “harmo-
ny between the methodology of the sciences of the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften), and the natural 
sciences.”88  In this respect, he mentions both Kurt Goldstein’s and Viktor von Weizsäcker’s 
conception of the behavior’s biological normativity,89 and he remarks with these authors that 
all the vital events, from their most elementary biological expressions, are not fixed responses 
to environmental stimuli, but the original creation of “forms” of behavior that function as 
“directions” for further future forms.  These forms are the immanent conditions of possibility 
of the behavior’s expressions.  In other words, according to Binswanger, there is something in 
existence that cannot be reduced to its simple material facticity: it is the condition of the 
possibility of facticity, or its “a priori structure.” Now, such an a priori structure is immanent 
to facticity, as it corresponds to its inner, normative organization. 
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Foucault gives a clear example of the daseinsanalytical concept of “a priori structure” in 
Maladie mentale et personnalité, where he presents the existential analysis of the structure of 
“anxiety,” a structure that Binswanger had analyzed in particular in the clinical case of Su-
zanne Urban.  Foucault describes this structure in terms of an “a priori of existence,”90 mea-
ning that it is a form of experience that, at once is both anchored to its individual and 
historical manifestations and cannot be thought before them, and also goes beyond them, in 
that it organizes and explains them, by giving the phenomena their norm.  So, the “existential 
a priori” is “historical” in that it is inseparable from the phenomenon in which it manifests 
itself by furnishing it with its form.  This is why Binswanger attaches a special importance to 
the dream and considers it as an expression of existence, insofar as the dream presents itself as 
the dramatization of this “a priori of existence” that Binswanger also calls the “sense-
direction” (Bedeutungsrichtung) or the “spiritual trend” (geistigen Tendenz) of existence.91  This 
is also the reason why Foucault—in his Introduction to “Dream and Existence”—remarks that 
what the dream “anticipates,” is “a prefiguring of history.”92  That is to say, in the “perfect 
future” represented by the dream the a prioris of existence present themselves as actual condi-
tions of possibilities of history.  Thus, Binswanger does not conceive of dreams as phenome-
non to be “interpreted,” but as “leading-category” (leitenden Kategorie)93 targeted to disentangle 
the “basic, a priori structures” of the pathological experiences. 
Here, Binswanger’s reference to both Goldstein and Weizsäcker’s medical anthropo-
logies is again of the utmost importance, in that for them, too, the biological concept of “a 
priori structure” of behavior was targeted to explain the forms of the living being not on the 
basis of a causal past, but from the perspective of the future.  In other words, even though 
these structures are “a priori”—they are “directions” of existence, leading-categories, so they 
are not yet actual—these a prioris emerge from the living being’s history and cannot be con-
ceived separately from this history.  For it is a matter of “empirical a priori.”  It is exactly this 
model that Binswanger has in mind when he turns to Heidegger’s concept of Dasein.  Thus, 
Heidegger’s methodological intuition that “the question of existence never gets straightened 
out except through existing itself”94 is declined by Binswanger in the field of the psychological 
research, and the Dasein becomes the theoretical tool by which the psychiatrist uncovers, in 
their history, the a priori structures or the conditions of possibility of the various existence’s 
expressions. 
This methodological approach to existence—one which moves from existence’s con-
crete historical forms in order to explain these forms themselves—is exactly what drew the at-
tention of the French philosophers towards Binswanger at a time when Canguilhem, by re-
ferring in turn to Kurt Goldstein, held that “the thought of the living must take from the living 
the idea of the living.”95  That is to say, the phenomenon of living cannot be explained but 
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from inside, from the living itself.  Therefore, it is no accident that Foucault focuses his atten-
tion on Weizsäcker at the same time he studies Binswanger.  More than in a doctrinal or “exis-
tentialist” sense, so phenomenology in this context is received by Foucault—through Binswan-
ger—as a methodological direction that asked philosophy to study the forms of experience in 
their history, in their concrete expressions.  On this basis, it is possible to understand better the 
sense of the repeated warnings that Foucault gives in his Introduction to “Dream and 
Existence,” where he claims that “detouring through a more or less Heideggerian philosophy 
is not some initiatory rite which might open a door to the esotericism of the analysis of Da-
sein.”96  This is also the reason why he explicitly maintains that existential analysis—even 
though it looks for the “a prioris of existence”—does not refer anthropology to some a priori 
form of philosophical speculation.”97 
I think that such an approach opens the way for conceiving transcendentality dif-
ferently from the purely gnoseological transcendentality with which Foucault deals in his 
archaeological analyses of, respectively, the Kantian “analytic of truth,” and Husserl’s “con-
stituting subjectivity.”  What Foucault outlines in his Introduction to Binswanger is the con-
ception of a paradoxical a priori, a “structural” a priori that emerges from the concreteness of 
experience, before being theorized.  It is a matter of a paradoxical transcendental that presents 
itself at the same time as a tool targeted to diagnose a particular existential configuration, and 
as the configuration principle to be diagnosed by means of such a diagnosis which is actually 
grounded on it.  The emphasis that Foucault—in his presentation of Binswanger’s analysis of 
dream—places on the future in order to show the (a priori) structures of existence is targeted 
exactly to point out this concurrence or simultaneity of reality and transcendentality: “The 
dream is already this future making itself,” it “is not a later edition of a previous form, it 
manifests itself as the coming-to-be.”98  That is to say that the conditions of possibility of exis-
tence coincide with existence itself, with an “existence which makes itself through time, that 
existence in its movement toward the future.”99 
Toward a Historical Epistemology 
Thus, what attracted the young Foucault towards Binswanger—at a time when he was looking 
for something different from the alternative between pure phenomenology and Marxism’s 
material causality100—is exactly the immanent way by which the existential analysis was able 
to explain experience by means of experience itself.  Binswanger’s approach indeed appeared 
as a thought that refused to lay the foundations of reality on a historical-material determina-
tion, on a constitutive subjectivity, or on some ontological speculation. 
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Even though it functions in a different context and presents different goals from clinical 
psychopathology, I believe that Foucault’s archaeological concept of “historical a priori,” from 
a theoretical point of view, presents a methodological affinity with the “structural a priori” 
outlined by Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse.  Therefore, it is at a methodological level that one 
should consider the compatibility between Foucault’s early work on Binswanger and the deve-
lopment of archaeology.  The “history” to which Binswanger and Foucault each refer is cer-
tainly not the same: while the psychiatrist is concerned with the patients’ individual life 
history, the “archaeologist of knowledge” aims at unraveling the epistemological changes and 
developments of sciences.  Furthermore, the young Foucault’s agreement with Binswanger 
was driven in part by something like the search for the verity of “man”‘s existence, a search 
that, on the contrary, is strictly banned from the archaeological epistemological concerns.  Yet, 
the way in which the two approaches inquire into phenomena—by means of a historicized a 
priori—appears to me to be still compatible.  In other words, both Binswanger’s existential 
analysis and Foucault’s archaeology deal with and work out the problem of reconciling the 
historicity of phenomena and the transcendentality of the theoretical research.  Just as 
Binswanger’s “a priori of existence” was the actual form or the normative, structural condition 
of possibility of the phenomenon, so Foucault’s historical a priori is “a condition of reality for 
statements,” “the specific form of their mode of being.” It is “the a priori of a history that is 
given.”101  More precisely, it is phenomena’s normativity: the “group of rules that are not im-
posed from the outside on the elements that they relate together; they are caught up in the 
very things that they connect.”102 
Such a concurrence or simultaneity between the conditions of reality and reality itself is 
why Foucault gives a theoretical account for the concept of historical a priori—in his 
Archaeology of Knowledge—only after he had already used it in The Order of Things.  In this latter 
work, Foucault indeed presents it as the “organization,” the “articulation,” the “arrangement” 
or the “mode of being of the objects,” the “structure” that “provides man’s everyday per-
ception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a dis-
course about things that is recognized to be true.”103  
In this passage of The Order of the Things, the concept of historical a priori is supposed 
to account for what Canguilhem—during those same years—had recognized as the episte-
mological distinction between the “true saying” (dire vrai), and the “to be in the true” (dans le 
vrai).”104  Many scholars have already pointed out what distinguishes Foucault’s perspective 
from Canguilhem’s.105  I would rather note here that the first occurrence of the notion of “his-
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torical a priori” from Foucault appears in a article of the early 1950s, which is then published 
in 1957 as “La recherche scientifique et la psychologie.”106  In this paper, Foucault recognizes 
the main feature of psychology in that it can choose to be scientific or not.  Different from 
sciences like physics or chemistry, which “emerge as possible research fields within an already 
scientific objectivity” (that is to say that they work in the frame of the “dire vrai”), psychology 
“does not articulate itself within the horizon of a science,” “in the space of a science,” “under 
the constellation of objectivity.”107  So psychology must decide about its own status.  It is a 
necessary choice, since only to the extent that it opts for scientificity could psychology become 
“true psychology.”108  Now, what outlines the contour of this horizon within which the “status 
of truth” of a science like psychology can be defined is exactly the historical a priori.  And yet, 
this a priori is the same horizon of which it maps out the conditions of possibility.  In other 
words, the historical a priori is contemporaneous to the reality that it detects and describes, it 
emerges and expresses itself only by its functioning.  That is why it should not be considered 
as an autonomous philosophical theme, but rather as an operational concept, a “diagnostic” or 
methodological tool.  A tool that is finally able to answer Foucault’s archeological demand for 
immanence, according to which “the history of knowledge can be written only on the basis of what 
was contemporaneous with it.”109 
Hence, the historical a priori presents itself as an explication of the phenomenon that is 
always immanent to the phenomenon’s description.  This is the reason why I maintain that the 
historical a priori is a concept that answers to at least two of the main methodological concerns 
of phenomenology: first, what I called the “principle of immanence,” according to which 
philosophical research should respect the phenomena and start from them in order to find 
their rationality; and secondly, the idea that phenomena are normative, and organize them-
selves according to a normative structure.  Thus, Foucault’s archaeology, from a methodolo-
gical point of view, would correspond to the concerns of the phenomenological research.  But, 
different from the purely philosophical phenomenology, it expands these concerns beyond the 
theory of knowledge (connaissance)—a theory working at the level of “dire vrai”—in order to 
study the historical emergence of knowledge as “savoir” (être dans le vrai).  As Foucault ex-
plains in his Birth of the Clinic, archaeology presents itself as an epistemology that “defines not 
the mode of knowledge, but the world of objects to be known.”110 
Interestingly, in this same passage from The Birth of the Clinic Foucault employs a meta-
phor taken from the psychological field.  With a critical reference to Gaston Bachelard’s The 
Formation of the Scientific Mind,111 Foucault asserts that what occurred to medical perception 
towards the end of the eighteenth century, “was not a ‘psychoanalysis’ of medical know-
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ledge.”  He goes on to state that “‘positive’ medicine is not a medicine that has made an ‘objec-
tal’ choice in favor of objectivity itself,”112 but a medicine that operates in an another “world of 
objects.”  Now, archaeology is interested in exactly such a world, that is, the “articulation of 
medical language and its object”113—an articulation which defines, “with its historical possi-
bility, the domain of its experience.”114  Foucault emphasizes the fact that, between the articula-
tion of the medical language and its object, “there can be no priority,”115 as words and things 
are contemporaneous.  That is to say that at “the heart of thing” there isn’t any primary and 
ultimate truth-origin, any objective evidence, but a “penetrating, profound historicity.”116 
Thus, Foucault distinguishes the gnoseological approach to knowledge (connaissance) 
from his own archaeological account for knowledge intended as “savoir.”  Now, it seems to me 
that such a distinction reflects at some points the way in which Foucault, in the 1950s, disting-
uished the theory of the objective meanings outlined by psychoanalysis from Binswanger’s 
attention to the particular world or “world-project,” within which meanings can mean what 
they mean, and they actually mean what they mean.  What emerges from Foucault’s position is 
a holist approach targeted to grasp the configuration of the “world” within which meanings 
are inscribed, that is, the global structure that rules the historical meanings of meanings, there-
by furnishing them with their conditions of possibility.   
Hence Foucault’s epistemology is historical in that it does not aim to penetrate the 
objective meanings of discourses, but “our own world of discourse.”117  Now, I believe that 
such an “historical epistemology” maintains a strong methodological link with the phenome-
nological approach in psychopathology with which the young Foucault had dealt during the 
1950s.  So, like Binswanger’s “Dream and Existence,” Foucault’s Introduction too, “brings us 
even more than it says.”118  And it brings us the idea that phenomenology could have its say in 
an epistemology which would not limit itself to a theory of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie), or a 
general theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre), but which works together with the history of 
sciences. 
I found quite interesting, in this respect, the way in which Kevin Thompson—in the 
above mentioned paper on “Historicity and Transcendentality”—considers Foucault’s ar-
chaeology as working under the rubric of a “phenomenology of the concept.”  Such a pheno-
menology, according to Thompson, would go back to Jean Cavailles’ methodological reading 
of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, to the extent that Cavaillès’s theory of science has 
opened “a new way of doing phenomenology, one that takes its bearings from the integration 
of the historical and the transcendental.”119  Still, I think that what Thompson calls the pheno-
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menology of the concept, in Foucault, does not arise from a theoretical option for the histori-
city of the transcendental, but from a methodological one.  As I have tried to show, Foucault’s 
historical a priori is an operational concept, a tool that can be grasped only by its functioning.  
It is a concept that cannot be thought independently from those sciences that, at the same time, 
it structures, and from which it can be disentangled.  The historicity of Foucault’s a priori con-
sists exactly in its contemporaneousness with these sciences, and not—as in the case of 
Cavaillès—in a theoretical intention of “accounting for the necessary intrinsic progress of 
scientific knowledge.”120  Foucault’s historical epistemology accounts for a necessity that is not 
the necessity of logic and science, but of the reality “of a history that is given.”  Nor such a 
necessity concerns the “scientific” rationality of knowledge, since the level in which such a 
necessity is analyzed is not the level of objectivity.  Actually, what the paradoxical concept of 
historical a priori points out is the concurrence of necessity and contingency: what Foucault’s 
epistemology calls “historicity” is not the “progress” of scientific knowledge, but the con-
currence, the contemporaneousness of rationality with the sciences that embody it. 
For this reason, I equally contest Thompson’s idea that Foucault would have been able 
to go beyond Canguilhem in that he has “moved from epistemology to archaeology.”121  In 
fact, if it is true—as Thompson rightly points out—that Foucault is not concerned, like Can-
guilhem, with “true saying,” but with the principles that determine what is to be “in the true,” 
this does not mean that, compared to Foucault, Canguilhem’s approach is limited.  According 
to Thompson, since the latter “remains within the internal parameters of its object,” then it 
“fails to account for the changing nature of scientific knowledge as a whole,” while “a pheno-
menology of the concept demands, then, that transcendentality and historicity be thought 
together.”122  I object to the thesis that Canguilhem’s epistemology presents itself as an impor-
tant attempt at historicizing the transcendental. 
I contend that Canguilhem’s choice of not going beyond the internal parameters of its 
object is exactly the methodological link between his approach and Foucault’s archaeology.  
Indeed, Canguilhem’s epistemology cannot be conceived separately from the history of 
science.123  Most importantly, this history is immanent to the object itself.  As Canguilhem 
maintains in his famous conference of 1966: “The history of sciences is the history of an object 
which is a history, which has a history, whereas science is the science of an object which is not 
history, which does not have a history.”124  This means that, even though Canguilhem analyzes 
the scientific objects at the level of “dire vrai,” this analysis cannot be done independently from 
the “être dans le vrai,” since it presupposes it.  The fact that epistemology cannot be conceived 
independently from history of science indeed implies an original and important meaning of 
historicity.  What makes the historicity of the scientific object, for Canguilhem, is not just the 
                                                 
120 Thompson, “Historicity and Transcendentality,” 7. 
121 Ibid., 12. 
122 Ibid., 15. 
123 See Georges Canguilhem, “The Object of the History of Sciences,”in Mary Tiles (trans.) and Gary Gutting 
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fact that sciences develop and change along the time, but the fact that the scientific object is an 
“object of the history of science.”  This means also that, in the last analysis, the historicity of 
such an object consists in its contemporaneousness with the historian that analyzes it.  This is 
the reason why it is not possible to go beyond “the internal parameters” of the object, and this 
is what makes the political sense of Canguilhem’s historical epistemology.125 
Sure enough, compared to Canguilhem, Foucault’s archaeology widens the frame of 
the inquiry of epistemology, in that it moves from the parameters of the objects to the wider 
frames of the epochs.  Yet, the methodological principle of the two analyses is the same, that is, 
an immanent inquiry into a reality in which the conditions of knowledge are at the same time 
conditioned.  I think that the sense of such a methodological affinity becomes clearer in the 
development of archeology into genealogy, insofar as genealogy—in that it is a critical ana-
lysis of the present by the present itself—emphasizes the paradoxical character of both ar-
chaeology’s historical and transcendental critiques.  Thus, it is no accident that Foucault comes 
back to Canguilhem precisely in the 1970s, at a time in which he dwells upon Nietzsche.  A 
Nietzsche that, by means of a genealogy intended as an immanent critique of reason, had been 
able to achieve the project of judging the finitude by the finitude itself.126  So, in 1978—through 
Canguilhem and Nietzsche—Foucault returns to the problem of “a rationality that aspires to 
the universal while developing within contingency”127 and, like Canguilhem, instead of 
recognizing here the failure of historical epistemology, he locates the powers of reason in the 
limits of reason.128 
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